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1. Overview  
In November 2011, after months of protests for the president of Yemen to resign, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh signed over power to his deputy, Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi, who took over power in 
February 2012. However, with Hadi in power the change the public sought did not come quick 
enough and the Houthis,1 who champion Yemen's Zaidi Shiite Muslim minority, took advantage 
of the political instability to take control of the Saada province and its neighbouring areas in the 
north. In September 2014 the Houthis moved into Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and by January 2015 
they had surrounded the royal palace. Hadi managed to escape, and by March 2015 the Houthis 
were attempting to take control of the entire country, which is when the air campaign led by 
Saudi Arabia against the Houthis joined the government and other local actors fight on the 
ground with the aim of putting Hadi back in power and preventing what they saw as Iranian 
influence in the region. It is under this chaos that the violent extremist groups have managed to 
grow in prominence in Yemen, taking advantage of the political turmoil and the international 
focus on the Houthis to carve out their own space in the country. 
This rapid review synthesises findings from rigorous academic, practitioner, and policy 
references, focusing on research produced after 2014 and the most recent escalation of conflict 
in Yemen, in order to examine the drivers behind, and the (un)appeal of, violent extremism in the 
country. As a conflict site, Yemen has been much under reported and researched and as a result 
there are limited studies on the various dynamics of violent extremism in Yemen. Consequently, 
this report will also point to research gaps and highlight areas where further research on violent 
extremism in Yemen is needed.  
The rise of violent extremism is closely tied to the civil war dynamics, rather than any desire from 
the population for a global jihad. Extremist groups have taken advantage of political grievances, 
regional inequality, and the anger from the loss of lives from either Houthis or air raids to forge a 
space to operate. Through offering services, a chance for revenge, and/or a means to carry out 
sectarian attacks they have gained supporters and recruits. Religion and a desire to act against 
the West are not the main drivers of extremism in Yemen. Rather, as this report will highlight, it is 
in the history of bad governance and the civil war that motivations for supporting and joining 
extremist groups should be sought. 
 Key findings are as follows: 
• Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) first gained control of territory in 2011 when it 
took advantage of political chaos; it once again managed to take control of territory 
following the current civil war, which began in early 2015. 
• AQAP’s aim is to create a number of smaller emirates, which will eventually link to form a 
caliphate when they deem the time is right. 
• AQAP is extremely well financed and has carried out a number of successful bank raids, 
kidnappings, as well as receiving finances from taxes through controlling ports and from 
smuggling. 
                                                 
1 The Houthis, or Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), began as a theological movement in Yemen in the 1990s and 
represent the Shiite Zayidi community in Yemen. Since 2004 they have intermittently been involved in conflict 
with the government over power division and the constitutional status of their stronghold the Saada Province. 
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• Islamic State (IS) operations in Yemen are currently fairly minimal and it does not share 
the same support as AQAP, as IS’ tactics of mass killings and mosque bombings are at 
odds with societal and tribal norms. 
• The civil war against the Houthis has opened up a vacuum for extremist groups to 
operate in, as not only are the Houthis the main focus of the government and coalition 
forces, but the government and coalition have also often made alliances with extremist 
groups in the fight against the Houthis. 
• Bad governance and instability have allowed extremist movements to embed politically 
and exploit the situation to gain support; AQAP has taken particular advantage of this by 
providing services in previously marginalised areas. 
• The perception of the population towards governance, levels of corruption, and the ability 
of the government to deliver services and security is extremely low, thus creating 
dynamics favourable to the rise of extremism. 
• Sectarianism has increased with the onset of the civil war, particularly as the Houthis 
make inroads into territories where Sunnis live. Extremist groups are able to take 
advantage of this increase in sectarianism and offer the Sunni population a means to 
take revenge or protect territory.  
• The proxy nature of the conflict with Saudi-Iranian competition in the Gulf being played 
out in Yemen, further amplifies the sectarian nature of the war and focuses the battle on 
a Sunni versus Shiite narrative, which in turn is used by extremists to gain supporters 
and justify violence.  
• Poverty in Yemen is a serious issue and there are large regional disparities in poverty 
levels, thus creating marginalised communities. The connection between poverty and 
marginalisation are a key contributing factor to the rise of AQAP in Yemen. 
• The ‘hard’ countering violent extremism (CVE) actions carried out by the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and United States mainly against AQAP often negatively impact on the 
population, which in turn is used by AQAP for propaganda and recruitment purposes. 
• The majority of the population does not share the ideologies of the extremist groups; 
motivations for supporting and joining these groups is rather found in the history of bad 
governance and the dynamics of the civil war.  
• Although the tribes do not necessarily share the ideologies of the extremist groups, their 
allegiance with groups such as AQAP has been a source of legitimacy and recruits. 
• Salifism in Yemen does not have a history of extremism, rather it was previously a factor 
in encouraging loyalty to the government; however, the dynamics of the civil war has 
pushed the support of the government more and more towards violence. 
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Research Gaps 
➢ The links between AQAP and the Salafi groups, and IS and the Salafi groups, as well as 
the level of cooperation between them, is understudied. 
➢ There is little information on the leadership and operations of IS in Yemen and 
considering that has been highlighted that IS could start moving its core operations out of 
Iraq and Syria, this is a much under researched topic. 
➢ Likewise, the finances of IS in Yemen are not clear, there is a lack of information as to 
whether it is reliant on IS in Iraq and Syria (and if so, how does it transfer the funds), or 
whether it funds itself.  
➢ The operations of the various Salafi groups is under researched and their existence 
within the army and resistance groups makes understanding them important for the post-
conflict stage, as unlike AQAP and IS, they will likely remain within the official security 
system.  
➢ The links between the extremist groups and the political parties needs to be further 
researched, as this will be important in any political settlement to the conflict. 
➢ There is very little research focusing on female involvement in violent extremism. 
➢ The research carried out by the Yemen Polling Center is very important for gauging the 
population’s perception on a number of issues. However, they do not assess the 
population’s perception on positive contributions by the extremist groups, which is 
important in order to counter the rise of extremism in Yemen.  
➢ There is a lack of research on the dynamics of areas where AQAP has been pushed out. 
It is important to understand the post-AQAP governance in order to adequately gauge 
whether the issues responsible for its rise are being addressed. 
➢ The Yemen Polling Center’s research clearly demonstrates the importance of the tribes 
to Yemeni Society, however there is a lack of research into the role they can play against 
AQAP in Yemen, as the tribes did against AQ in Iraq between 2005 and 2010. 
➢ Although the impact of hard CVE is often mentioned, there is not enough focused 
research on the role it plays in the rise of extremist groups in Yemen.  
➢ The Rand Corporation points to there being a conflation between political violence and 
political activism, but does not study this further. Further research is needed to firstly 
confirm whether this is true, and secondly, if it is true, to examine how the two can be 
separated in a CVE programme. 
➢ There is limited research on successful or unsuccessful CVE programmes in Yemen, and 
more research is necessary to identify potential areas for success, as well as to identify 
past mistakes. 
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2. Actors 
This section examines the key actors involved in violent extremism in the south and east of 
Yemen in order to give a clearer understanding of their rise before examining the drivers of 
violent extremism in Yemen. 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Background 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in 2009 after the Saudi and Yemeni 
branches of Al Qaeda merged following the counterterrorism efforts of Saudi Arabia, which drove 
the Saudi branch across the border into Yemen (Stanford University, 2017). The earlier jihadist 
organisations which AQAP originate from consisted of a number of fighters who returned from 
Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s after fighting the Soviets. Amongst these fighters 
were a number of foreign jihadists, including Osama bin Laden, who pushed for a central role for 
Yemen in the global jihad. These groups were used by the Saleh regime to first fight the Soviet-
backed government of South Yemen and then against secessionists in the south (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2015). AQAP is currently led by Qasim al-Raymi who took over in June 2015 
following the death of Nasir al-Wuhayshi in a US drone strike. Ibrahim al-Asiri, AQAP’s chief 
bomb maker, is also crucial to the organisation’s operations (Counter Extremism Project, 2016). 
In 2011, AQAP created a parallel group, Ansar al-Sharia (AAS; Supporters of Islamic Law), to 
widen its domestic appeal and separate the local group from its international brand, which many 
Yemenis viewed as an instrument of the regime (International Crisis Group, 2017). Towards the 
end of Yemen’s President Saleh’s reign AQAP took advantage of the fractured political scene by 
establishing an insurgency in southern Yemen gaining direct control of territory in 2011. 
However, when Saleh was removed and replaced by transitional president Hadi in early 2012, 
AQAP lost control of the territory. Since civil war erupted in February and March of 2015, AQAP 
has used the political vacuum to develop its own pseudo-state in the southern region. AQAP has 
also been strengthened by the fact that Western intelligence forces have withdrawn from the 
country over safety concerns and Yemeni and Saudi forces have mainly focused on Houthi 
rebels, thus giving AQAP more space to function (Counter Extremism Project, 2016). 
Ideology and Goals 
AQAP is widely believed to be the Al Qaeda affiliate most ideologically similar to Al Qaeda’s 
core. AQAP’s goal is to establish an Islamic Caliphate and implement Sharia law and expel Jews 
and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula. In order to achieve these goals AQAP follows a 
violent interpretation of jihad. AQAP’s ideology and practices also follow Al Qaeda’s wider aim of 
working towards global Islamist domination (Counter Extremism Project, 2016). Beginning with 
the creation of its affiliate Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP has focused on working within local norms, 
forging alliances with Sunni allies, and assimilating into militias. AQAP presents itself to the local 
population as being part of a wider Sunni front against Houthi expansion. There is the aim of 
creating territorial control through local backing with the purpose of creating multiple emirates 
that would eventually lead to the creation of a caliphate (International Crisis Group, 2017). This is 
part of Al Qaeda eventual goal to establish a global caliphate, with Yemen and Iraq seen as 
building blocks towards its establishment (USIP, 2016).  
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Income 
AQAP has managed to take advantage of the political chaos in Yemen to make considerable 
financial gains, which in turn have aided its progress as an organisation. They firmly established 
themselves as part of the wartime political economy, which includes smuggling, kidnapping, 
robberies, and taxes. For instance, AQAP looted the Mukalla bank, in April-May 2015, of a figure 
reported to exceed $111 million. It also imposed import levies at the Mukalla and Ash-Shihr 
seaports, and has even been involved in smuggling fuel and goods to the Houthi forces. AQAP 
managed to gain a significant war chest through its control of the Mukalla port, and although they 
lost control of it in April 2016, the funds gained should last them some time. AQAP’s accumulated 
revenues enhance its ability to purchase military hardware and attract recruits; it also allows it to 
offer salaries significantly higher than the government (International Crisis Group, 2017). AQAP 
has long used hostages as a way of extracting income and hostage taking is said to have 
significantly contributed to the running of the organisation in the periods before it managed to 
gain control of ports and carry out raids of large banks (Counter Extremism Project, 2016). 
According to the International Crisis Group (2017), AQAP also manages to gain funds and arms 
through their links to the forces fighting the Houthis on the ground. 
 
Strength 
The US State Department estimated in 2015 that AQAP’s forces numbered approximately 4,000 
fighters. The focus on defeating the Houthi forces has greatly benefited AQAP, allowing them to 
control territory for long periods of time, which in turn has allowed them to gain weapons, funds, 
and recruits (International Crisis Group, 2017). 
AQAP’s primary stronghold is located in the al-Mahfad area of the Abyan Province in southern 
Yemen where most of their training camps are based. However, they also have training camps in 
the governorates of Shabwa, Hadramawt, and Marib. Due to civil war in Yemen many of the 
security forces are fighting against the Houthi’s in the north. This has opened up a vacuum for 
AQAP to operate in the south. Through providing security and public services to the local 
population AQAP have managed to gain some form of legitimacy. Their modus operandi is to 
gain the trust of the community through providing them with the missing services and 
infrastructure, rather than forcing them into submission like IS has done in Iraq and Syria 
(Counter Extremism Project, 2016). 
AQAP’s control of territory is changing daily (mainly between them and the government), 
however the following three maps from February, March, and June 2017 respectively give a 
better understanding of AQAP’s presence in Yemen.  
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Figure 1: AQAP’s control of territory in February 2017 
 
Source: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017  
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Figure 2: Control of territory in Yemen in March 2017 
 
Source: BBC, 2017 
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Figure 3:  AQAP’s control of territory in June 2017 
 
Source: Farrukh, 2017 
Relationship with other groups 
The Islamic State (IS)2 is seen as direct competition to AQAP and its leaders have publicly 
criticised IS, denouncing its attacks on mosques. However, they have praised attacks by those 
claiming to act on IS’s behalf in the West. Currently both groups are competing for the same 
supporters and recruits, rather than collaborating in any way. AQAP has links with the Salafi 
groups, however the workings of these relationships are understudied (International Crisis 
Group, 2017).  
 
                                                 
2 Although referred to as the Islamic State in this report, this term only came into being after a caliphate was 
declared on 29 June 2014 and they were formerly known, and are often still referred to, as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 
They are also often referred to as Daesh, which is based on the Arabic acronym of their name and has negative 
connotations. 
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Islamic State (IS) 
Background 
IS’ presence in Yemen was first announced in November 2014 when a group of fighters 
proclaimed their allegiance to IS’ leader al-Baghdadi in an online audio recording, later the same 
month the IS Yemen affiliate was acknowledged by al-Baghdadi himself. IS has gone on to 
establish a presence in a number of Sunni-dominated areas in the governorates of Aden, 
Hadramawt, Sanaa, Taizz, Lahij, Shabwah, and al-Bayda. At the time of their arrival there was 
said to be an internal battle amongst the leadership of AQAP, which they hoped to take 
advantage of to gain support. Little is known about the leadership of IS in Yemen, however the 
most well-known leader is Nashwan al-Adeni (Kuoti, 2016). 
Ideology and Goals 
The ideologies of IS in Yemen follow that of IS itself in aiming to build a global caliphate and 
mobilise Muslims to engage in jihad against unbelievers in the West and alleged apostate states 
in the Muslim world. Yemen is of strategic importance to IS due to its border with Saudi Arabia, 
which is of religious significance for the group (Kuoti, 2016). However, they do not share the 
same level of support as AQAP, as IS’ tactics of mass killings and mosque bombings are at odds 
with societal and tribal norms. Correspondingly, IS in Yemen has faced some difficulties with 
internal mutinies and over 100 members have publicly left the group claiming it was violating 
Sharia in Yemen (International Crisis Group, 2017). IS’ vision in Yemen is for the Aden–Abyan 
Province to serve as its Yemeni capital (Arrabyee, 2016).  
Currently IS’ tactics in Yemen revolve around causing as much violent havoc as possible and 
they have used targeted assassinations, suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices to 
reach this goal. IS’ attacks have mainly focused on the Yemeni security forces, however they 
have also targeted a number of Houthi mosques. Unlike AQAP, IS does not currently attempt to 
gain and maintain control of territory Yemen (Kuoti, 2016). 
Income 
There is very little written on the income of IS in Yemen, although as it does not hold territory or 
provide services its operational costs would be minimal. Moreover, IS is well financed through its 
operations in Iraq and Syria. 
Strength 
Unlike AQAP, IS in Yemen does not attempt to provide the local population with services and 
also criticises AQAP for focusing on soft power rather than on global jihad (Kuoti, 2016). IS in 
Yemen is seen as far more brutal than AQAP and as a result they have been more successful in 
areas driven by sectarianism, such as the southern port city of Aden. Many of IS’ members have 
experience in Syria and Iraq and they use the same strategy of embedded networks of 
informants and local propagandists. IS routinely uses suicide bombings at military recruitment 
centres and mass gatherings of soldiers collecting salaries (International Crisis Group, 2017).  
Although IS does not control territory in Yemen, it does operate training camps in areas in the 
south (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). IS has also been gaining support in 
Houthi-controlled areas in the northwest, as Salafi groups turn to them following defeat at the 
hands of the Houthis (Arrabyee, 2016). 
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Like AQAP, IS has used the chaos of the battle between the government/coalition forces and the 
Houthis to increase its operations in Yemen. Correspondingly, as IS loses territory in Iraq and 
Syria, it is likely that more of its operations will move to countries like Yemen where the dynamics 
make it easier to operate (Kuoti, 2016). However, the maps below demonstrate that IS’ 
operations in Yemen decreased in 2016 when compared to 2015.3 
Figure 4: IS attacks in Yemen between March and December 2015 
 
Source: Zimmerman and Diamond, 2016  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Although the 2015 map covers a time period of ten months and the 2016 map only covers five months, when 
adjusted to take into account this difference there was still a decrease in operations. 
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Figure 5: IS attacks in Yemen between January and May 2016 
 
Source: Zimmerman and Diamond, 2016 
 
Relationship with other groups 
IS and AQAP are in direct competition with one another for both support and operating territory, 
however IS is said to have some links with the Salafi groups (Kuoti, 2016). 
 
Salafi Militias 
Background 
Yemen has been home to a range of Salafi groups for some time now, although prior to the war 
they were both non-political and mainly non-violent. The understanding of the workings of the 
Salafi groups is limited as it is IS and AQAP that dominate the headlines. However, the Salafi 
groups have extensively taken up arms in response to the Houthi’s expansion towards the south. 
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Fighters from the Dar al-Hadith religious institute in Dammaj, Saada and from a religious institute 
in Kitaf, Saada have combined forces and are fighting Houthis on a number of fronts 
(International Crisis Group, 2017).   
Salafis have grown in prominence due to the alliances they have forged and through the backing 
of the Saudi-led coalition. For example, in Aden, they act as state-sponsored irregular security 
forces with the backing of United Arab Emirates (UAE). The al-Mehdhar Brigade, based in 
Sheikh Othman and Mansoura districts, which acted as a local security force in 2015, joined 
other Saudi-supported Yemeni forces in crossing the Saudi-Yemeni border in an attempt to push 
into Saada, the Houthi stronghold in October 2016. Another group, the Security Belt forces – a 
UAE-supported militia established by presidential decree in May 2016 to help secure Aden and 
led by Nabil Mashwashi, a former South Yemen army commander – has a significant Salafi 
component (International Crisis Group, 2017). 
Salafis are often at the forefront of the Saudi-led coalition-sponsored efforts to repel Houthi 
advances and there are a number of different factions whose alliances are continually changing. 
Since December 2016, Salafi and other resistance militias have nominally been integrated into 
the Yemeni army while remaining separate in reality (International Crisis Group, 2017). 
Ideology and Goals 
There are a number different factions within the Salafi movement in Yemen, however, they are 
tied together by their conservative views that Islam is represented by the early, righteous 
generations of Muslims, known as the Salaf, whose practices they aim to follow (Baidhani, 2016). 
Therefore, for many Salafis, Houthis (who practise Zaidi Islam) follow deviant practices 
considered to be un-Islamic (Barron and al-Muslimi, 2016).  
Many Salafis are also fighting the Houthis for revenge following the Houthi move into Dammaj in 
the northern province of Saada where they expelled and killed many of the Salafi population in 
2014 (al-Sakkaf, 2015). 
Income 
The Salafi groups receive support from Saudi Arabia and UAE, as well as through their traditional 
funding method of religious donations (International Crisis Group, 2017).  
Strength 
The Salafi groups are particularly active in Yemen’s third largest city, Taiz, where it is said that 
their forces are the largest amongst the anti-Houthi resistance alliance. As Salafis fight within the 
coalition-backed forces it is difficult to gauge their numbers, however their influence is growing 
(Kalfood, 2016). 
Relationship with other groups 
The Salafi groups are connected to, and fighting with, the Hadi government. There are 
allegations against a number of groups that they have strong links to and are colluding with 
AQAP and IS. These include reports that they are fighting alongside each other and sharing 
arms that the Salafi groups receive from both Saudi Arabia and UAE (International Crisis Group, 
2017). 
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Research Gaps 
- The links between AQAP and the Salafi groups, and IS and the Salafi groups, as well 
as the level of cooperation between them, is understudied. 
- There is little information on the leadership and operations of IS in Yemen and 
considering that IS will start moving its core operations out of Iraq and Syria, this is a 
much under researched topic. 
- Likewise, the finances of IS in Yemen are not clear, there is a lack of information as to 
whether it is reliant on IS in Iraq and Syria (and if so, how does it transfer the funds), 
or whether it funds itself. 
- The operations of the various Salafi groups is under researched and their existence 
within the army and resistance groups makes understanding them important for the 
post-conflict stage, as unlike AQAP and IS, they will be within the system.  
- The links between the extremist groups and the political parties needs to be further 
researched, as this will be important in any political settlement to the conflict. 
 
3. Drivers of Extremism 
This section aims to examine the main drivers behind the rise of violent extremism in Yemen post 
2014. However, it must be highlighted that there is a considerable lack of studies focusing purely 
on this topic and research addressing extremism usually form a sub section of analyses of 
conflict in Yemen. 
Civil War 
War zones provide a perfect environment for jihadi groups to recruit members and gain 
supporters. Moreover, conflict marginalises moderate political alternatives, allowing extremism to 
flourish. In both 2011 and 2015, AQAP took advantage of Yemen’s chaos to capture territory in 
the south (USIP, 2016).  
Additionally, the opportunity for extremists to exist in Yemen has long been there; the state has 
previously supported violent jihadist groups for its own political gain. This has given Jihadists a 
strong base from which to grow in Yemen. Since the transfer of power between Saleh and Hadi 
the dynamics have changed in Yemen as state institutions have faltered, which has allowed 
radical groups to capitalise and gain prominence. These favourable dynamics for extremism 
have been compounded by the Houthis taking control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 
2014 and the onset of the current civil war in Yemen in 2015. The ability of AQAP to gain and 
control territory post 2011 increased its opportunities to gain recruits and support from the 
population (International Crisis Group, 2017).  
The war dynamics following 2015 have further helped groups like AQAP and IS, as the security 
forces do not have the ability to focus on defeating them and a number of security vacuums have 
been created where AQAP and the Salafi groups in particular have been able to fill the gaps. The 
war against the Houthis has also made AQAP and IS a non-priority for the Saudi-led coalition, 
whilst the Salafi groups have become allies. Moreover, AQAP has been able to merge itself with 
the anti-Houthi opposition, which in turn has given it access to arms and finances. The relative 
ease of operation of these extremist groups has made it simpler to recruit and also blurred the 
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lines between their ideologies and that of protecting Sunnis and territory from the Houthis 
(International Crisis Group, 2017). 
The ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ mentality of those fighting the Houthis has allowed 
extremist groups, particularly AQAP and the Salafists, to not only operate without hindrance in 
many areas, but also to be aided when it suites the aims of those fighting the Houthis. This 
freedom makes it easier to recruit members and detracts from the illegitimacy of joining an 
extremist organisation (al-Dawari, 2014).  
The graph below by the Yemen Polling Center demonstrates how in the south, where extremist 
groups mainly operate, the population sees the bad security situation as being the biggest threat 
to their security by a long way and nationally terrorism barely features as a threat to security.4 
This is important as both USIP (2016) and the International Crisis Group (2017) highlight these 
dynamics as being primed for extremist groups to take advantage of the situation. 
Figure 6: Public opinion about main threats to security 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 40. 
 
                                                 
4 These polls were carried out in a EU-funded project in February and March 2017 with 4000 respondents and 
with an equal divide between men and women. 
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Bad Governance 
The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) argues that bad governance and instability have 
allowed extremist movements to embed politically and exploit the situation to gain support. They 
go on to argue that the correlation between bad governance, instability and the rise of extremism 
is evident in the 2016 Fragile States Index, where Libya, Syria, Mali, and Yemen deteriorated the 
most over the past decade (USIP, 2016).  
The historic bad governance in Yemen has seen the population seek out services from other 
providers and AQAP has filled this gap. Not only has AQAP provided services, such as water, 
electricity, education and a justice system, it has also paid compensation to families whose 
homes have been destroyed by drones and airstrikes. Thus, cementing the notion in some areas 
that the government and its allies are unable to meet the populations’ needs, whilst AQAP is. 
Therefore, it has been argued that AQAP’s support is based on its ability to fill the security and 
governance vacuum left by the government, rather than of any strong support of its ideologies 
(International Crisis Group, 2017). Additionally, many people in Yemen have supported extremist 
groups out of pure frustration of the government’s inaction in providing services and better 
governance (al-Dawari, 2014). 
AQAP has found success in parts of Yemen that lack of electricity or access to water. There is a 
correlation between an area’s impoverishment and marginalisation and its susceptibility to 
infiltration by AQAP. Therefore, once AQAP delivers basic services they are able to win the 
population over to an extent, even if they do not follow the same ideological beliefs as AQAP. 
However, a support base opens up the opportunity for recruitment. This in turn points to bad 
governance and the lack of services as a key driver to the rise of AQAP in Yemen (al-Muslimi 
and Barron, 2017). 
The two graphs below taken from the Yemen Polling Center demonstrate the perception that the 
population has of the role of governance units in their area, with the majority viewing them as not 
making any impact or of making a negative impact. This links to the argument that AQAP is able 
to gain support through the provision of missing services and infrastructure (Counter Extremism 
Project, 2016).  
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Figure 7: Public opinion on the role of local councils 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 77. 
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Figure 8: Public opinion on the role of political parties  
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 78. 
The above graph is particularly telling when the same question is asked about the tribes in the 
graph below where the people’s perception is all together far more positive. 
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Figure 9: Public opinion on the role of tribes 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 82. 
Issues with corruption are closely tied to bad governance and are also seen as partly responsible 
for creating anger that can lead to members of the population joining extremist groups.  
Therefore, the population’s perception of corruption is an important factor in the growth of 
support for extremist groups (Shelley, 2014). The graph below demonstrates the extremely 
negative perception in Yemen of the prevalence of corruption and the lack of efforts to tackle it.  
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Figure 10: Public opinion on the fight against corruption 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 21. 
As argued by USIP (2016) and the International Crisis Group (2017) the bad security situation in 
Yemen, not only gives extremist groups an easy route into the country and territories, it also 
allows them to gain support and members through offering security where the government has 
failed to, thus increasing their legitimacy. The graph below demonstrates how little the population 
relies on the security services for the provision of security. It is important to note here that the 
questionnaire used by the Yemen Polling Center gives no option for the participants to 
demonstrate if they see security as being provided by AQAP or the Salafi groups and it is unclear 
whether the population may class these groups as ‘popular resistance’. A common issue with the 
research conducted by the Yemen Polling Center is that they do not give the option for the 
participants to demonstrate what they see as positive contributions by the extremist groups, 
which in turn does not allow for an understanding of what the population sees as being offered by 
these groups in place of the government.  
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Figure 11: Public opinion on security provision 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 87.  
Bad governance and security provision, as well as the lack of delivery of services create 
dynamics favourable to the rise of extremist groups (al-Dawari, 2014; al-Muslimi and Barron, 
2017; International Crisis Group, 2017; USIP, 2016). 
The three graphs below demonstrate the little faith the population has in the government, as they 
believe the political situation, the security situation and the provision of public services are getting 
worse.  
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Figure 12: Public opinion on the quality of public services 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 27. 
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Figure 13: Public opinion on the political situation 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 29. 
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Figure 14: Public opinion on the security situation 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 22. 
Sectarianism  
Conflict in Yemen has fuelled sectarianism and groups such as AQAP, IS and the extreme 
Salafists have benefited from it. Houthi military expansion into Sunni areas is predominantly 
responsible for the increase of sectarianism by Sunnis. At the same time, the conflict against the 
Houthis has opened opportunities for the extremist groups to forge alliances with locals. The 
actions by Houthis against Sunnis often creates anger amongst the population who in turn want 
to take revenge. Extremist groups feed on this anger to gain recruits and alliances (International 
Crisis Group, 2017). For instance, following the Houthi move into Dammaj where they expelled 
and killed many of the population in 2014, there was an increase in radicalisation as members of 
the population sought revenge against the Houthis, which extremist groups were able to take 
advantage of in their recruitment drive (al-Sakkaf, 2015). It was not until the war and the Houthis 
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capture of Sanaa that IS established a foothold in Yemen. Sectarianism not only gives extremist 
groups the ability to recruit, but also allows for them to establish themselves within local 
communities (International Crisis Group, 2017).  
The proxy nature of the conflict, with Saudi (Sunni)-Iranian (Shiite) competition in the Gulf being 
played out in Yemen, further amplifies the sectarian nature of the war. The battle and the 
language on the ground has been that of Sunnis against Shiite (Zaidi), with both Houthis and 
extremist Sunni groups using this language to gain supporters and justify violence. The growing 
sectarianism and the idea of a Sunni defence against Shiite Houthis has been particularly helpful 
in AQAP forging alliances with the tribes and Salafis. Through creating AAS, AQAP has also 
made it easier for recruits to join, as membership does not have the same stigma or historical link 
to AQ and its global jihad. Rather, membership becomes a local Sunni defence against the 
Houthi enemy. This way affiliate groups are created to gain and protect territory (International 
Crisis Group, 2017). AQAP also has strong links to the local tribes, which help with recruitment 
and forming alliances against the Houthis (Engel, 2017). 
Poverty 
Poverty in Yemen is an issue that existed prior to the recent escalation of conflict and which has 
been compounded by the civil war. The Word Bank claims that poverty in Yemen is deeper and 
more severe than in other MENA countries, whilst the poverty gap is also high. More worryingly, 
in the context of the rise of extremist groups, is the large regional and governorate disparities in 
poverty, as this creates a feeling of unfairness that can be taken advantage of by extremists.5 As 
has already been highlighted, AQAP has been the most successful in marginalised parts of 
Yemen, where they have taken advantage of the situation and offered benefits to the population. 
Poverty and unemployment cannot be viewed in isolation as causes for radicalisation, but they 
are argued to be contributing factors and this correlation cannot be ignored (Botha and Abdile, 
2014). With little alternatives, radical groups offer employment and an opportunity to vent anger 
at the system. It is argued that many young people joined AQAP because they were poor and 
uneducated and AQAP provided employment, a sense of belonging, and a purpose for young 
recruits (International Crisis Group, 2017). However, as already highlighted, the issue goes 
beyond poverty to political grievances with a system that has fostered a significant poverty gap, 
and thus poverty becomes intertwined with political anger towards the system – to which 
extremist groups offer an outlet (al-Muslimi and Barron, 2017).  
The graph below demonstrates people’s perception of employment and the economy in Yemen. 
The negative perception demonstrated can potentially feed into radicalisation, or at least the 
population seeking alternatives (Botha and Abdile, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/01/20/poverty-in-yemen  
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Figure 15: Public opinion on the situation for jobs and the economy   
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p. 15. 
Whilst the graph below demonstrates how high poverty and living conditions feature on the 
issues of concern for the population.  
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Figure 16: Public opinion of issues of greatest concern for people’s lives 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p.13.  
Finally, the graph below demonstrates the effect the war has had on the employment and income 
status of the population. In summary, the population is extremely concerned about poverty, they 
feel it is getting worse because of the war, and the war has directly impacted the earnings of half 
those surveyed. Thus, if poverty is identified as one of the contributing factors to the rise of 
extremism, Yemen is primed for extremist groups to take advantage of the situation – as they 
already have (Botha and Abdile, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2017).   
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Public experiences of loss of jobs or income due to the war 
 
Yemen Polling Center, 2017: p.48. 
Hard CVE 
The hard Counter Violent Extremism (CVE)6 carried out by the UAE with US support is argued to 
be counter productive and fuels rather than counters extremism. Moreover, in areas, such as 
Mukalla, where forces backed by the UAE have managed to push out AQAP, the government 
has not been able to successfully improve local governance and services, thus in theory giving 
AQAP a symbolic victory (Engel, 2017).  
                                                 
6 Hard CVE refers to using aggressive force against violent extremists, whereas soft CVE refers to introducing 
policies that address the cause of violent extremism. 
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In addition the ‘hard’ actions by the UAE and US, as well as the forces they back, against AQAP 
often have a negative impact on the population, which in turn can be used by AQAP for 
propaganda and recruitment purposes. For instance, in January 2017 in a raid by UAE and US 
forces against AQAP it was reported that 25 civilians were killed including nine children under the 
age of 13 (Shabibi and al-Sane, 2017) According to the International Crisis Group: 
The use of U.S. soldiers, high civilian casualties and disregard for local tribal and political dynamics 
– many killed were local tribesmen motivated by the internal Yemeni power struggle as much as or 
more than AQAP’s international agenda – plays into AQAP’s narrative of defending Muslims 
against the West and could increase anti-U.S. sentiment and with it AQAP’s pool of recruits 
(International Crisis Group, 2017: p.28.). 
Whilst the United Nations accuses the Hadrami Elite Forces, which are backed by the UAE, of 
forcibly disappearing countless individuals and ill-treating others – many of whom are not known 
to have actual links to AQAP (UN, 2017). These actions along with the often-indiscriminate drone 
attacks are seen to be counterproductive, as instead of weakening AQAP they make them 
stronger by alienating the population and potential CVE partners on the ground.  Moreover, 
AQAP has grown in strength and finances despite years of hard CVE against them (al-Muslimi 
and Barron, 2017).  
Research Gaps 
• The research carried out by the Yemen Polling Center is very important for gauging the 
population’s perception on a number of issues. However, they do not assess the 
population’s perception on positive contributions by the extremist groups, which is 
important in order to counter the rise of extremism in Yemen.  
• There is a lack of research on the dynamics of areas where AQAP has been pushed out. 
It is important to understand the post-AQAP governance in order to adequately gauge 
whether the issues responsible for its rise are being addressed. 
• The Yemen Polling Center’s research clearly demonstrates the importance of the tribes 
to Yemeni Society, however there is a lack of research into the role they can play against 
AQAP in Yemen, as the tribes did against AQ in Iraq between 2005 and 2010. 
• Although the impact of hard CVE is often mentioned, there is not enough focused 
research on the role it plays in the rise of extremist groups in Yemen.  
 
4. The (un)appeal of violent extremism and violent 
extremist groups 
This section addresses the factors that make members of the population of Yemen choose to 
support or not support violent extremism, although many of these elements have already been 
discussed in the previous section. 
General Support 
Many of the studies examined for this report highlight that supporters of extremist groups in 
Yemen do not necessarily follow the ideologies of the group, particularly that of a global jihad 
(see for example: al-Sakkaf, 2015; Engel, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2017; Robinson et 
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al., 2017). Rather, people support the groups due to the governance and services they provide 
and join the groups as a means to carry out revenge, fight for their sect/territory, or to act on their 
political frustrations. This is further evidenced by the lower support that IS has in Yemen and that 
AQAP thought it necessary to form an affiliate group not connected to its global jihad in order to 
win the local population’s support. Thus, there is a correlation between historic bad governance, 
the civil war, and the rise of extremist groups in Yemen and it is within these dynamics that 
motivations for supporting and joining extremist groups should be sought. It is important to note 
that the support for these groups in Yemen is not significant, as evidenced by the general 
population cheering when AQAP is pushed out of the territory it holds; rather extremists take 
advantage of circumstances and often gain support out of convenience (International Crisis 
Group, 2017). However, it is argued in areas with high levels of drone strikes and civilian 
casualties, public anger is fuelled and a cycle of vengeance is formed where extremist groups 
are able to take prominence as a means to achieve revenge (al-Muslimi and Barron, 2017). 
Tribal Support 
Tribal allegiances are very important in Yemen and AQAP has close ties to many tribes in the 
south of Yemen.7 Again, this does not necessarily mean that the tribes follow the same 
ideologies, but rather it is argued that they are frustrated with the government and often form 
alliances with AQAP to avoid conflict in their territory, or as allies in tribal feuds. The links 
between tribes and AQAP is however a source of legitimacy and recruits for AQAP and has been 
instrumental to its growth (al-Dawari, 2014; al-Muslimi and Barron, 2017). 
Salafism 
Salafist movements are often seen as being closely connected to violent extremism. However, in 
Yemen, the history of Salafism is apolitical and more closely connected to charity work than 
jihad. That is not to say that there have not been violent elements, but rather that mainstream 
Salifism was connected to loyalty to the government and was typified by its charity work. 
Nonetheless, Salifist groups did carry out acts of violence against minority groups, but this was in 
conjunction with the government rather than in the form of a rebel militia. However, with the onset 
of the war, the increased sectarianism, and the rise of the Houthis, this government support has 
led to a closer connection between Salifism and violent extremism. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the connection between Salifism and violent extremism in Yemen is more to do with the 
dynamics of the civil war than the traditions of Yemeni Salifism itself (Bonnefoy, 2009; Baidhani, 
2016). 
Rejecting or Participating in Violent Extremism 
The Rand Corporation has carried out a large research project examining what makes people in 
Yemen reject violent extremism. The study included six focus groups (three female, three male) 
within the 18-34 age group and a national survey with 1200 respondents in May 2016. Their 
                                                 
7 The al-Awaleq, al-Kazemi, and al-Nu’man tribes released statements against the government’s operations 
against AQAP in their territory in 2014.  Whilst al-Awaleq, one of the largest tribes in South Yemen, also singed 
an agreement with AQAP guaranteeing their safety if they refrained from fighting the military in the tribe’s 
territory. 
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findings highlight that the respondents seemed to conflate political violence with political activism 
and thus those who were politically active were more likely to participate in violent extremism. 
Closely linked, those who did not see much chance of progress in Yemen were more likely to 
engage in violence. Respondents who had been assaulted by the security services were more 
likely to consider engaging in violence as an act of revenge. The Rand Corporation’s study also 
found that urban respondents were more likely to engage in violence. Based on these findings 
the Rand Corporation argues that CVE should focus on protecting civilians from the security 
forces and concentrate CVE efforts in urban centres. Although the Rand Corporation points to 
the conflation between political activism and violence, they do not examine further how to 
separate the two and make political activism a viable alternative to violence (Robinson et al., 
2017). 
Research Gaps 
• The Rand Corporation points to there being a conflation between political violence and 
political activism, but does not study this further. Further research is needed to firstly 
confirm whether this is true, and secondly, if it is true, to examine how the two can be 
separated in a CVE programme. 
• There is limited research on successful or unsuccessful CVE programmes in Yemen, and 
more research is necessary to identify potential areas for success, as well as to identify 
past mistakes. 
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